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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Joseph Richard Clinton appeals from his sentence for Lewd Conduct with
a Minor Under 16.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Clinton lured seven year old N.C. into his trailer house by inviting N.C. and
her four year old brother inside to see his puppies. (PSI, pp.1_2. 1) N.C.'s brother
did not enter the trailer because he was scared. (PSI, p.2.)

Clinton played

"freeze tag" with N.C. and he touched N.C.'s vaginal area, skin to skin. (PSI,
pp.2-3.)

After N.C. left Clinton's trailer, Clinton went into his bedroom and

masturbated. (PSI, p.3.)

Clinton told law enforcement officers that he felt he

needed treatment because it helped with "the urges." (PSI, p.3.)

"Clinton

admitted being attracted to children and said he fantasized about little girls all of
the time." (PSI, p.3.)
A grand jury indicted Clinton for Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under 16.
(R., pp.24-25.)

The state sought a persistent violator sentencing enhancement

based on Clinton's prior conviction for Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under 16. 2 (R.,
pp.41-42.) Clinton's trial counsel moved to have Clinton committed based on the
competency evaluation Dr. Beaver performed, which indicated that Dr. Beaver
had reservations about Clinton's competency to stand trial. (R., pp.47-4S; S/30/10
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file
"ClintonPSI.pdf."
2 Clinton pled guilty to having anal/genital contact with an eight year old boy on 2
or 3 occasions. (PSI, pp.115-16.) During the investigation of that crime, Clinton
"told police he molested about fifty (50) children in a hundred different situations."
(PSI, p.g.)
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Psychological/Competency Evaluation, p.8.) Thereafter, Dr. Beaver reviewed a
videotape of Clinton's interview with law enforcement officers and audio
recordings

of

Clinton's

phone

calls

from

jail.

(10/13/10

Psychological/Competency Evaluation Amended Report, pp.2-3.) Based on this
additional information, Dr. Beaver concluded that Clinton was competent to stand
trial because Clinton "did not appear to be as significantly impaired with regard to
his memory abilities and episodes of confusion" as Dr. Beaver first observed
when he examined Clinton. (Id. at 3-4.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Clinton pled guilty to Lewd Conduct with a
Minor Under 16 and the state dismissed the persistent violator enhancement. (R.,
pp.57-64; Tr., p.11, LA - p.13, L.13; p.16, Ls.1-3.)

The state agreed to

recommend a 25 year sentence with three years fixed, and either probation or a
period of retained jurisdiction if Clinton's psychosexual evaluation indicated that
he was amendable to treatment. (Tr., p.13, L.15 - p.14, L.7.) The district court
ordered a psychosexual evaluation and a social/sexual assessment and Clinton's
trial counsel stipulated to providing Clinton's prior competency evaluations to the
psychosexual evaluator. 3 (PSI, pp.8, 15-36; R., pp.65-66; Tr., p.34, L.23 - p.35,
L.22.) The psychosexual evaluation and the social/sexual assessment were both
provided to the district court prior to sentencing. (PSI, p.8.) The district court
imposed a unified sentence of 20 years with three years fixed and ordered the
sentence executed. (R., pp.68-69; Tr., p.53, L.24 - p.54, L.3.) The district court

Clinton is not challenging the use of his competency evaluations in the
presentence process on appeal because he waived his Fifth Amendment rights
prior to sentencing. (Appellant's brief, p.3.)
3

2

"specifically recommend[ed] that the Defendant participate in Sex Offender
treatment while incarcerated." (R., p.69; Tr., p.54, Ls.22-25.)

Clinton filed a

notice of appeal timely from the judgment. (R., pp.71-73.) Clinton filed a timely
I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (R.,
p.75; Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration Under ICR 35, pp.1-2
(augmentation).) Clinton also filed a second /'C.R. 35 Motion, which the district
court denied. (Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence, ICR 35
(augmentation)l

Clinton is not challenging the denial of either of his I.C.R. 35 Motions on appeal
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)

4
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ISSUES

Clinton states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion and act in manifest
disregard for the pertinent provisions of I.C.R. 32 and the
requirements of I.C. § 19-2522, when it failed to sua sponte
order a mental health evaluation of Mr. Clinton prior to
sentencing?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a
unified sentence of twenty years, with three years fixed,
upon Mr. Clinton following his plea of guilty to lewd conduct
with a minor under sixteen?

(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Clinton did not request a separate I.C. § 19-2522 psychological evaluation
and the district court did not order one. Has Clinton failed to claim or
demonstrate fundamental error in sentencing?

2.

Has Clinton failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Clinton Has Failed To Claim Or Demonstrate Fundamental Error In Sentencing
A.

Introduction
Clinton underwent a psychosexual evaluation, a competency evaluation,

and a social/sexual assessment prior to sentencing. (PSI, pp.15-36; 8/30/10
Psychological/Competency Evaluation, pp.1-9.) Clinton argues that the district
court manifestly disregarded I.C.R. 32 by not ordering a separate mental health
evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-15.) This argument
fails because it was not preserved by objection and Clinton has not claimed,
much less shown, that the asserted error is fundamental.
B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether
the issue was preserved is a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho
457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989). Absent a timely objection, the
appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error under the
fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961,
979 (2010).

Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Clinton to

demonstrate the error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to

5

whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless."
Perry. 150 Idaho at 228,245 P.3d at 980.

C.

Clinton Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Psychological
Evidence Before The Court At Sentencing
Clinton claims that the district court erred by not ordering an additional

psychological exam prior to sentencing, asserting that appellate review is
appropriate because there has been an alleged "manifest disregard" of a
procedural rule. (Appellant's brief, p.6.) While there is authority from the Idaho
Court of Appeals allowing such review, see,

~,

State v. Jones, 132 Idaho 439,

442, 974 P.2d 85, 88 (Ct. App. 1999), the Idaho Supreme Court has recently
called such authority into doubt. In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d
961, 978 (2010), the Court stated that "where an error has occurred at trial and
was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, such error shall only be
reviewed where the defendant demonstrates to an appellate court that one of his
unwaived constitutional rights was plainly violated." The language of the Idaho
Supreme Court is unambiguous.

Unpreserved claims of error "shall only be

reviewed" on appeal if the record shows a plain violation of a defendant's
"unwaived constitutional rights."

As such, Clinton must demonstrate that the

error he claims is fundamental under the test employed by Idaho Supreme Court
because Clinton did not request an additional psychological evaluation or object
to the lack of such an evaluation prior to or at the time of sentencing.
Clinton has failed to show fundamental error. He has failed to show that
the type or nature of the psychological evaluation considered at sentencing is of

6

constitutional significance. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to indicate
that a different evaluation than the ones conducted prior to sentencing would
have had any effect on the ultimate sentence imposed.
Even if psychological evaluations at sentencing hearings are somehow
exempt from the Idaho Supreme Court's declaration that only fundamental error
will be reviewed in the absence of an objection, the record shows that there was
no manifest disregard for the rules and statutes governing such evaluations. In
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 566, 650 P.2d 707, 708 (Ct. App. 1982), the
Idaho Court of Appeals held that regardless of fundamental error "[m]anifest
disregard" of I.C.R. 32 "could not be countenanced on appeal without diminishing
the reputation of the judicial process." The appellate court could therefore review
for manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32 "in order to protect the integrity of the courts."

kL

"However, we will not review a contention, made for the first time on appeal,

that compliance with the rule was simply inadequate - e.g., that the [PSI] report
should have developed a particular point further, or that certain information was
incomplete or inaccurate.
hearing."

kL

Those are matters to be raised at the sentencing

at 566-67, 650 P.2d at 708-09.

Review of the record shows no

manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32 or I.C. § 19-2522 because Clinton's claim goes
only to the adequacy of the evaluations, not whether there was manifest
disregard of the applicable law.
Idaho Code § 19-2522( 1) states that "[i]f there is reason to believe the
mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for
good cause shown," the court must appoint a psychiatrist or psychologist to
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evaluate and report upon the defendant's mental condition to inform the court's
sentencing decision. That statute also states that the report of the examination
must include the following:
(a) A description of the nature of the examination;
(b) A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental condition of
the defendant;
(c) An analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect
and level of functional impairment;
(d) A consideration of whether treatment is available for the
defendant's mental condition;
(e) An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or
nontreatment;
(f) A consideration of the risk of danger which the defendant may
create for the public if at large.

I. C. § 19-2522(3).
"The requirements of I.C. § 19-2522 are complimented by Idaho Criminal
Rule 32 which specifies the elements to be included in the presentence report.
These elements include information on the health of the defendant where
relevant to the sentencing decision, I.C.R. 32(b)(8), and, where appropriate, the
presentence

investigator's

analysis

and

recommendation

regarding

a

psychological examination, I.C.R. 32(b)(10)." State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho
817, 822, 229 P.3d 1179, 1184 (Ct. App. 2010). "A psychological evaluation is
not required in every case where the defendant claims some mental illness or
disability."

kl

"Rather, the decision of whether to obtain a psychological

evaluation lies within the sentencing court's discretion."

kl

(citing I.C.R. 32(d);

State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364, 366, 195 P.3d 723, 725 (Ct. App. 2008); State
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v. Craner, 137 Idaho 188,189,45 P.3d 844,845 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Jones,
132 Idaho 439, 442, 974 P.2d 85, 88 (Ct. App. 1999». "As with any discretionary
determination, however, the district court's action must be consistent with the
applicable legal standards." State v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 879, 876 P.2d
158, 161 (Ct. App. 1994). "A district court's election not to order a psychological
evaluation will be upheld on appeal if the record can support a finding that there
was no reason to believe a defendant's mental condition would be a significant
factor at sentencing or if the information already before the court adequately met
the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3)." Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 822, 229 P.3d
at 1184.
Clinton claims that "the materials before the district court did not function
as an adequate substitute for a full I. C. § 19-2522 mental health evaluation."
(Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Clinton only specifically identifies two of the statutory
requirements he claims were omitted from the evaluations.

(Appellant's brief,

pp.13-14 (claiming there was no evaluation of "whether treatment is available for
the defendant's mental condition" and there was no "analysis of the relative risks
and benefits of treatment or nontreatment.,,5) Clinton's complaint merely goes to
the adequacy of the evaluation, and therefore may not be brought for the first
time on appeal.

Toohill, 103 at 566-67, 650 P.2d at 708-09 (contentions that

compliance with the rule was inadequate must be raised at the sentencing
hearing). Furthermore, Clinton has failed to demonstrate that the district court

5 Clinton mostly asserts that the district court drew incorrect conclusions from the
evaluation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-13.) Whether the sentencing court drew
correct conclusions at sentencing is a different question from whether the district
court manifestly disregarded I.C.R. 32 by not ordering a new evaluation.
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erred by not ordering an additional psychological evaluation prior to sentencing
under either the fundamental error standard or the manifest disregard standard.
The record establishes that the district court had ample information about
Clinton's psychological condition.
In Clinton's PSI, the presentence investigator summarized Clinton's
physical and mental health condition. (PSI, pp.7-B.)

Clinton reported that he

thought he was in good health, but he felt that "being very hard of hearing limited
his activities." (PSI, p.7.)

Clinton stated that he was involved in sex offender

counseling "a long time ago" and he indicated that he thought he could benefit
from counseling again. (PSI, p.7.) The presentence investigator noted that it was
difficult communicating with Clinton because of Clinton's "inability to hear well."
(PSI, p.7.)

As part of the presentence investigation process, Clinton was

assessed with the Level of Service Inventory Revised ("LSI-R"). (PSI, p.10.)
According to Clinton's results on that test, some identified risk factors that may
contribute to his criminal behavior include "unstructured use of leisure/recreation
time; emotional/personal issues; limited education and lack of employment; poor
financial situation; and attitude/orientation." (PSI, p.10.)

The presentence

investigator reviewed Clinton's earlier PSI, which stated that Clinton was "not
amienable [sic] to any kind of therapy. He is not intellectually able to gain insight
or make behavioral changes." (PSI, pp.7-B.)

The earlier PSI also stated that

Clinton "is a threat to children in the general public." (PSI, p.B.)
The

presentence

investigator

summarized

Clinton's

psychosexual

evaluation and his social/sexual assessment and recommended that "a lengthy
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period of incarceration would protect society, deter Mr. Clinton from sexually
offending children, hold him accountable for his actions against this victim, and
provide the opportunity for Mr. Clinton to participate in counseling and treatment
in a secure environment." (PSI, pp.8-10.) The presentence investigator did not
give any indication that additional psychological testing was necessary, which is
reasonable considering the extensive psychological evaluations that were
performed prior to sentencing. (See PSI, p.10-11 (discussing "Treatment
Programs andlor Optional Recommendations").)
The first psychological evaluation was performed by Dr. Beaver in order to
determine

whether

Clinton

was

competent

to

stand

trial.

(8/30/10

PsychologicallCompetency Evaluation, p.1.) Over the course of three days, Dr.
Beaver interviewed Clinton and Clinton underwent a psychometric test battery
that included 16 separate psychological tests. (Id. at 1-2.)
After performing these tests, Dr. Beaver thoroughly discussed Clinton's
physical and mental condition:
Richard Clinton was seen and evaluated in a conference
range of motion at the Ada County Jail. He ambulated somewhat
slowly but independently. He had to be escorted to and from the
testing room reportedly because he could not locate it by himself.
He does wear eyeglasses. He does wear a hearing aid that he
switches back and forth between his ears. His basic personal
hygiene and grooming appeared adequate.
During the course of interviewing and testing, he was alert
but very distractible. He presented with very poor hearing, which
resulted in instructions having to be repeated several times. He
also would often present as if he understood what was being said
but it would become quite clear that he had little understanding.
Even when he appeared to understand a basic instruction, he was
not always successful in following through and responding,
meandering in his behavior. Expressively, he could communicate
11

his basic thoughts and ideas but did have some articulation
problems at times because of poor dentures.
Interpersonally, he maintained eye contact with the
examiner. He appeared to attempt the tests required of him.
However, he was emotional during much of my interview time, often
becoming tearful and requiring time to regain his composure. Also,
he had a tendency to get focused on specific issues or concerns
and it was difficult for him to get back to the topic at hand. Insight
appeared poor. He was oriented to person and place but was not
consistently oriented to time.
(ld. at 2-3.)
Dr. Beaver then discussed Clinton's background and Clinton's ability to
understand the legal process. (Id. at 3-5.) Dr. Beaver analyzed the degree of
Clinton's mental illness and the level of Clinton's functional impairment by
analyzing the neuropsychological test results. (ld. at 5-9.) Dr. Beaver's overall
impressions of Clinton were that:
Mr. Clinton presents as being quite impaired. He has poor
hearing that interferes with communication. He appears to be
relatively limited in his communication abilities even without the
hearing problem. I suspect that historically, he has functioned in
the low end of dull normal. This certainly would be consistent with
his reported history of only attending school into the eighth grade
and essentially being unable to read or write with any functional
ability.
He now presents with much greater difficulty.
More
specifically, he presents with poor ability to stay focused. He has
significant difficulties with retaining new information. He is easily
confused and overwhelmed.
(Id. at 7.)
Dr. Beaver diagnosed Clinton with Dementia and Adjustment Disorder
with Depressed Mood. (Id.) Dr. Beaver stated that it was "difficult to determine
what the source of [Clinton's] neurocognitive difficulties would be" and noted that
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if "Clinton has a primary dementia such as the Alzheimer's type, I anticipate it will
be extremely difficult to restore Mr. Clinton to a functional competence." (Id. at 79.)

However, Dr. Beaver ultimately concluded that Clinton was competent to
stand trial after reviewing a videotape of Clinton's interview with law enforcement
officers and audio recordings of Clinton's phone calls from jail.

(10/13/10

Psychological/Competency Evaluation Amended Report, pp.2-3.) Although Dr.
Beaver was never able to completely rule out a primary dementia, Dr. Beaver
was able to inform the district court of the severity of Clinton's mental illness, as
well as Clinton's level of functional impairment. (ld. at 2-5.) Dr. Beaver was also
able to analyze the treatment options available for Clinton's mental health
condition. (Id. at 4-5.)
In addition to the two Psychological/Competency Evaluation reports
prepared by Dr. Beaver, the district court ordered a psychosexual evaluation and
a social/sexual assessment. (PSI, pp.8, 15-36; R., pp.65-66.) The psychological
information contained in those reports is extremely thorough. (PSI, pp.15-36.)
During the psychosexual evaluation, Dr. Johnston reviewed a considerable
amount of information regarding Clinton's mental condition and Dr. Johnston
used that information to determine Clinton's "DSM-IV diagnosis, risk level to reoffend, capacity for treatment, recommendation regarding violent predator status,
conclusions, and suggestions for management." (PSI, pp.24-26.)

During the

psychosexual evaluation, Dr. Johnston administered three psychological tests in
addition to the 16 previous psychological tests performed by Dr. Beaver, but the
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new tests did not produce valid results due to "what appeared to be low
intellectual functioning." (PSI, p.24.)

Dr. Johnston analyzed Clinton's mental

condition and psychological symptoms. (PSI, p.25.)

Dr. Johnston diagnosed

Clinton with Pedophilia, Sexual Abuse, Adjustment Disorder with Anxious Mood,
and Borderline Intellectual Functioning (Possibly Mental Retardation). (PSI,
pp.25-26.)

Dr. Johnston noted that "individuals who have low intellectual

functioning could sometimes act on their inappropriate sexual impulses purely
based on incapacity to contain sexual desires, and not related to personality
issues." (PSI, p.25.)

Dr. Johnston concluded that Clinton poses a "high risk to

re-offend" based on numerous psychological and sexual variables that Dr.
Johnston considered. (PSI, pp.29-32.)
After concluding that Clinton posed a high risk of reoffending, Dr. Johnston
analyzed the potential benefit of treatment and discussed whether treatment was
available for Clinton's mental condition. (PSI, pp.34-36.)

Dr. Johnston

recommended sexual offender treatment in a "structured environment" along with
psychological measures and polygraph examinations to track the progress and
honesty of Clinton during treatment. (PSI, pp.34-36.)

However, Dr. Johnston

noted that Clinton's "limited intellect might create limitations regarding his
capacity to comprehend topics discussed in treatment and apply them to his life."
(PSI, p.33.)
Despite all of the psychological information regarding Clinton's mental
condition that the district court had before it prior to sentencing, Clinton claims
that the district court was required to sua sponte order an additional mental
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health evaluation because "there never was a mental health evaluation which
actually diagnosed the extent of Mr. Clinton's dementia." (Appellant's brief, p.13.)
Clinton primarily bases this argument on his opinion that the district court denied
his "request for probation or a period of retained jurisdiction based solely on Mr.
Clinton's 'dementia,' and the perceived negative impact it would have on his
amenability to treatment." (Appellant's brief, p.6.) Clinton's argument is without
merit.
The specific extent of Clinton's dementia was not a "significant factor at
sentencing" because it was not a "key underlying factor in the defendant's
commission of the crime." See State v. Shultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288, 233 P.3d
732, 735 (Ct. App. 2010) (stating that "raJlthough not exclusive, a defendant's
mental condition can be a significant factor at sentencing when. that condition
may be a key underlying factor in the defendant's commission of the crime,
especially when the actions are a serious departure from the defendant's history
and character."). The crime at issue here was not a departure from Clinton's
history or character in any way.

Clinton was previously convicted of Lewd

Conduct with a Minor Under 16,6 which is the same crime he was convicted of in
this case. (PSI, pp.4-5.) His prior offense was "part of a continuing pattern of
behavior" that consisted of Clinton having sexual contact with children and that
pattern of conduct continued when he committed the instant offense. (PSI,
p.117.) Clinton has a "willingness to groom and manipulate in order to satisfy his

6 During the investigation of that crime, Clinton told law enforcement officers that
he "had sex with approximately 50 different children" and he "advised that he has
had a problem with children for more than 20 years and was relieved when he
was finally able to tell someone about his problems." (PSI, p.138.)
15

sexual desires" and "his most recent inappropriate sexual behavior was highly
concerning, and suggested fairly deep-seated attitudes that supported child
molestation, beliefs that support manipulation of others, poor impulse control,
sexual entitlement, and callousness towards his victim." (PSI, p.31.)
Furthermore, even assuming that the Extent of Clinton's dementia was a
significant factor at sentencing, the district court did not manifestly disregard
I.C.R. 32 or I.C. § 19-2522 because it had had ample evidence regarding
Clinton's mental condition and the district court appropriately considered
Clinton's mental condition as it related to Clinton's prospects for rehabilitation.
(See Tr., p.47, L.12 - p.55, L.5.; see also Order Denying Motion for
Reconsideration Under ICR 35, pp.1-2 (augmentation).

As stated recently by

the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Windom:
When evaluating the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation, trial
judges are asked to make a probabilistic determination of a human
being's likely future behavior. The reality is that a sentencing judge
will never possess sufficient information about the defendant's
character, life circumstances and past behavior so as to project
future behavior with unerring accuracy. To the contrary, the factual
determination of the defendant's probability of re-offense will always
be based upon limited data. This extraordinarily difficult task is
made more difficult because it is merely one factor to be considered
by the sentencing judge-and a subordinate consideration at that.
State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359,363,304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1956)
("Rehabilitation is not the controlling consideration . . ., The
primary consideration is, and presumptively always will be, the
good order and protection of society.").
150 Idaho 873,253 P.3d 310, 316 (2011).
It was clear from both the competency evaluation and the psychosexual
evaluation that Clinton's possible dementia and his low intellectual functioning
could have an effect on Clinton's prospects for rehabilitation.
16

However, the

district court never found that Clinton's dementia was "untreatable" as Clinton
argues. (Appellant's brief, p.13.)

Although the district court expressed its

concerns about Clinton's ability to control his impulses and his ability to be
rehabilitated, the district court followed Dr. Johnston's suggestions and
recommended treatment in a "secure facility" where Clinton "would not have any
access to children." (Tr., p.51, L.11 - p.54, L.10; PSI, p.32.) The district court did
not "solely focus[] on Mr. Clinton's possible dementia when it refused his request
for probation or period of retained jurisdiction." (Appellant's brief, p.15.)

The

district court denied Clinton's request for probation primarily out of concern for
the safety of the community and the district court denied his request for a rider
because the district court did not think a rider would be appropriate based on
Clinton's prior criminal history. (Tr., p.52, Ls.3-7; p.53, Ls.6-10.) As such, it was
unnecessary for the district court to order an additional psychological evaluation
and the district court did not manifestly disregard I.C.R. 32 or I.C. § 19-2522.
Clinton next relies on State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 229 P.3d 1179
(Ct. App. 2010), for his contention that the district court erred when it failed to sua
sponte order an additional mental health evaluation. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.)

However, that case is distinguishable. In Jockumsen, the district court did not
order any psychological evaluations prior to sentencing other than the
defendant's competency evaluations. 148 Idaho at 819, 229 P.3d at 1181. The
district court pronounced a sentence, but expressed a need for additional
information on the defendant's mental health and decided to retain jurisdiction for
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180 days and request a mental health evaluation during the retained jurisdiction
period.

kl

After determining that the defendant's mental condition was a significant
factor for sentencing, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the district court did
not sufficiently comply with I.C. § 19-2522 because that "statute requires that the
evaluation be conducted before sentencing so that the trial court will have the
benefit of the evaluator's insights in fashioning an appropriate sentence."

kl

at

823, 229 P.3d at 1185 (emphasis original).
Here, the district court had significantly more information regarding
Clinton's mental condition than the district court in Jockumsen had regarding the
defendant. In addition to two psychological/competency evaluation reports, the
district court had a comprehensive psychosexual evaluation and a social/sexual
assessment.

Furthermore, the district court had all of these psychological

evaluations prior to sentencing.

Therefore, the holding in Jockumsen is

inapplicable to the facts of this case
Clinton's claim that the district court should have sua sponte ordered an
additional psychological evaluation pursuant to I. C. § 19-2522 should not be
considered on appeal because there is neither a claim nor a showing of
fundamental error. The psychological evaluations that the district court ordered
prior to sentencing were more than sufficient to satisfy the requirements of I.C. §
19-2522. Even if this Court were to apply the "manifest disregard" standard and
review non-fundamental error in the absence of an objection, Clinton has failed to
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show that the district court manifestly disregarded I.C.R. 32 or I.C. § 19-2522 in
light of the facts shown in the record.
II.
Clinton Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
Clinton asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed

a unified sentence of 20 years with three years fixed. (Appellant's brief, p.16.)
Clinton has failed to establish an abuse of sentencing discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion

standard considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho
722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460,
50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838
(2007)).

It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the

defendant's probable term of confinement. Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at
391 (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).
sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the

Where a
burden

of

demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11
P.3d 27 (2000)).
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C.

Clinton Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its
Sentencing Discretion
Clinton asserts that the district court abused its discretion by ordering the

underlying sentence of 20 years with three years fixed executed in light of his
mental health issues, his amenability to treatment, support from friends, and his
employment background. (Appel/ant's brief, pp.16-20.)
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appel/ant
must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the
facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.

A sentence is reasonable,

however, if it appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting
society or any of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or
retribution. 19.,.
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court considered the
objectives of sentencing, the seriousness of Clinton's offense, his criminal history
and the danger he presents to children in the community. (Order Denying Motion
for Reconsideration Under ICR 35, pp.1-2 (augmentation); Tr., pA7, L.12 - p.50,
L.22.) The district court also considered Clinton's amenability to treatment, his
employment history, and his "very high risk to reoffend." (Tr., p.50, L.23 - p.53,
L.23.) Clinton's criminal history includes a prior conviction for Lewd Conduct with
a Minor Under 16. (PSI, ppA-5.) That offense was "part of a continuing pattern
of behavior" that consisted of Clinton having "anal/genital contact, oral/genital
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contact and attempted intercourse" with at least three children? (PSI, p.117.) In
addition to those victims, Clinton admitted to molesting about 50 children in over
a hundred incidents. (PSI, p.118.)

Clinton provided the names of several of

those children and "advised that he generally prefers rectal sex with boys." (PSI,
p.134.) Clinton had access to the children "through family and employment with
a carnivaL" (PSI, p.9.)
During Clinton's psychosexual evaluation, Dr. Johnston asked Clinton if he
believed his victims had the potential for negative consequences because of their
sexual interactions with Clinton. (PSI, p.27.) Clinton responded, "[t]hat's a hard
one to figure out.

I think they might just forget about it." (PSI, p.27.)

Dr.

Johnston determined that Clinton poses a "high risk" to reoffend based, in part,
on Clinton's "pedophilia and propensity towards sexual abuse." (PSI, pp.29-31.)
Dr Johnston stated:
He seemed sexually attracted to both male and female children,
coupled with an incapacity to contain his urges, in addition to
willingness to groom and manipUlate in order to satisfy his sexual
desires. Furthermore, one would expect that after ten years of
treatment he would have better insight and capacity to contain
these urges if such were to develop. Consequently, his most
recent inappropriate sexual behavior was highly concerning, and
suggested fairly deep-seated attitudes that supported child
molestation, beliefs that support manipulation of others, poor
impulse control, sexual entitlement, and callousness towards his
victim ....
(PSI, p.31.)

Based on Clinton's high risk of reoffending, Dr. Johnston

recommended that Clinton should be required to enroll in sexual offender

Clinton was accused of sexually abusing five children. (PSI, p.117.) Clinton
admitted to sexually abusing three of the children, but "stated he could not recall
any abuse occurring with" the other two children. (PSI, p.117).
7
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treatment in a "structured environment." (PSI, p.34.)

However, Dr. Johnston

noted that "[c]onsidering the examinee had previously participated in ten years of
sexual offender treatment and still re-offended, in addition to taking into account
his limited intellect, there were concerns regarding how much more he could
learn from sexual offender treatment." (PSI, p.33.)
The presentence investigator recommended:
At the court's discretion a lengthy period of incarceration
would protect society, deter Mr. Clinton from sexually offending
children, hold him accountable for his actions against this victim,
and provide the opportunity for Mr. Clinton to participate in
counseling and treatment in a secure environment.
(PSI, p.1 D.)
At Clinton's sentencing hearing, the district court stated:
I think it's really a great blessing that the child in this case was
comfortable enough to tell somebody else what was going on so
that we could stop something that looks like it's likely to be a very
serious problem.
As far as we know, that problem is not more extensive, but
it's very worrisome, because Mr. Clinton did have a significant
pattern. It is very possible that the treatment was successful for a
while.
But Mr. Clinton has been diagnosed by Dr. Johnston with
having a serious level of this problem, which is an Axis I diagnosis
of pedophilia. Under all circumstances, even with people who are
younger and mentally sounder, that's a terrible diagnosis. It's a
terrible diagnosis as far as risk to the community.
Dr. Johnston says that he presents a very high risk to
reoffend.
(Tr., p.5D, Ls.5-24.) The district court also stated:
what we have right now is a very serious issue that the defendant is
suffering from dementia, which will probably worsen his ability to
understand and internalize additional counseling.
If the prior
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counseling was successful, it appears that success appears to -that success appears to be dimming now.
Unfortunately, I think this is a very risky picture. It really
looks like possibly the emerging dementia, coupled with pedophiliac
disposition, is just -- is at a worsening place, and that's what would
be my assessment, based on what's before me. And that, at best,
he would have to start treatment in a secure facility.
It's not clear if the treatment can be successful, based upon
his deteriorating condition.
And it is clear that he presents a risk to children. He is a
proven risk to children in the past._ He is a proven risk to children in
the near past. And where he lives is a place where he's likely to be
exposed to other children.
And besides which I think his abilities to control his impulses,
which never was as strong as some people with the sturdier
intellectual gifts, but it appears that he was able to control his
impulses.
I'm afraid that what's going on for whatever reason appears
to be lessening his ability to control his impulses. So I think it's
unfortunate, but I think we have limited options.
(Tr., p.51, L.11 - p.52, L.16.) The district court did not "see a rider with the sexual
offender assessment group as being an appropriate placement in this case"
because "that is more designed for people who are coming into the system for
the first time." (Tr., p.53, Ls.6-10.)
In denying Clinton's motion for reduction of sentence under I.CR. 35, the
district court further explained the reasoning behind the sentence imposed:
The defendant is a pedophile. He has extremely serious prior
convictions for lewd conduct with an eight year old boy. He has
admitted to molesting two other little boys. He told officers at one
point that he had sex with fifty children. In this case, he lured a little
girl into his trailer and played "touching games" with her which
involved manual to genital contact. He says he is attracted to
children and fantasizes about sex with little girls all of the time. He
represents a grave risk to the safety of children. The Court's
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sentence was very reasonable and fair and was designed to protect
the most vulnerable members of the community.
(Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration Under ICR 35, p.2 (augmentation).)
The district court appropriately determined that a period of incarceration
was necessary to protect the public and imposed a reasonable sentence. The
sentence imposed was appropriate in light of the seriousness of Clinton's
offense, his lack of remorse, and the danger he poses to society.

Given any

reasonable view of the facts, Clinton has failed to establish an abuse of
sentencing discretion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Clinton's conviction and
sentence.
DATED this 21 st day of November, 2011.
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